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Abstract—There are many situations where vehicles may
compete with each other to maximize their respective utilities.
We consider a narrow alley where two groups, eastbound and
westbound, of autonomous vehicles are heading toward each of
their destination to minimize their travel distance. However, if
the two groups approach the road simultaneously, it will be
blocked. The main goal of this paper is to investigate how wireless
communications among the vehicles can lead the solution near to
Pareto optimum. In addition, we implemented such a vehicular
test-bed, composed of networked robots that have an infrared
sensor, a DC motor, and a wireless communication module:
ZigBee (IEEE 802.15.4).
Index Terms—Wireless Ad Hoc Communications, Vehicle-
to-Vehicle (V2V) Communications, Robotic Networks, Non-
cooperative Game Theory, Test-bed
I. INTRODUCTION
These days, vehicular communications emerged out of in-
dustrial technologies and opened a global market to solve a
road traffic problem [1]. Most of existing work in vehicle-to-
vehicle (V2V) communications and vehicle-to-infrastructure
(V2I) communications can enhance a safety precaution and an
efficiency road transport system such as preventing accident,
and reducing traffic congestion via the wireless communi-
cations. Particularly, in autonomous vehicular networks the
wireless communications can be used as sharing information
to collaborate among the vehicles [2]. In [3], the networked
robots based on ZigBee (IEEE 802.15.4) are able to communi-
cate with other colleague robots by using the wireless multihop
communications to find an exit path. In order to solve a
minimum-time surveillance problem, the autonomous vehicles
also collaborate with others via the wireless communications
[4]. These autonomous vehicles have to share infrastructure
like the road with others and they have limited resources, such
as a battery life, a time constraint and so on. For these reasons,
the autonomous vehicles compete with each other to maximize
their utility in a distributed system.
In this paper, we suggest a vehicular game theoretic model
for a narrow alley. The width of road is limited to only one
direction like a one-way street, but it is faster than a detour.
So the selfish autonomous vehicles use this fast but busy way.
If two groups of autonomous vehicles in the narrow alley are
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Fig. 1. The test-bed of three vehicles in the narrow alley
heading toward each of their destinations simultaneously, then
the road will be blocked by themselves. The utility of each
vehicle is maximized when its escaping time from the road is
minimized. With a distributed and parallel manner, the vehicles
are able to achieve near to Pareto optimum using the wireless
ad hoc communications among the vehicles.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
First, we introduce our problem and find a solution by
using a central authority. Second, we design our distributed
non-cooperative and one-shot game theoretic algorithm from
the two-vehicle to the multiple-vehicle problem. Third, we
describe how we handled the game theoretic problem on our
ZigBee based networked robot test-bed. Then we show our
simulation results. Finally, we conclude the paper.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We assume that there are I vehicles in the length of the
narrow alley L. The action set is A = {+1, 0,−1}. In this
road the vehicle i chooses the action, ai ∈ A, each time slot.
We consider minimizing the maximum elapsed time problem
in the road where two groups, eastbound and westbound,
of autonomous vehicles are heading toward each of their
destinations. The problem is described as follows:
min
{a1,a2,···,a|I|}
max
{
f1 (a1), f2 (a2), · · ·, f|I|
(
a|I|
)}
, (1)
where fi (ai) denotes the expected elapsed time of vehicle i
when it chooses the action ai.
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2Fig. 2. The utility function is composed of the block shape and the triangle
shape. The type of vehicle i is high in the unselfish region, but it is low in
the selfish region.
If we assume that all of vehicles are controlled by a central
authority, then the problem of (1) could be solved as follows:
fi (ai) = te,i + (L− xi) +
(
1−ai
2
)
(L− xj∗ + xi) , (2)
where te,i and xi are the elapsed time of vehicle i and the
passed distance of vehicle i, which is the summation of the
actions from the initial to the current time, respectively. xj∗ is
the passed distance of the last vehicle among the vehicle i’s
opponents. The central authority finds the maximum passed
distance, xmax. If the group contains the vehicle having xmax,
then the member of this group is defined as the high priority
group. On the contrary, the other group has the low priority.
Depending on the priority, the central authority controls all of
the vehicles. If the vehicle i has the high priority, then the
central authority gives it the forwarding action, ai = +1 and
calculates the expected elapsed time of vehicle i using (2).
Likewise, if the vehicle i is the member of the low priority,
then the authority orders it to have the backwarding action,
ai = −1. The last escaping vehicle of the group having the
low priority is the solution of the problem of (1).
Each the utility of vehicle is maximized when its escaping
time from the narrow alley is minimized possibly. In the next
section to find the solution of (1) in a distributed manner, we
take a game theoretic approach that leads to a solution near
to Pareto optimum.
III. GAME THEORETIC APPROACH
Each of vehicles has a utility function which is composed
of its type and the expected elapsed time, ui(θi, fi). In Figure
2, the shape of the utility function is described as a block
and a triangle shape. The former is the unselfish region
where they would make way for the others; the latter is the
selfish region where they choose the action to maximize their
payoff selfishly. The type of vehicle i is high, θi = UR, in
the unselfish region. On the contray, it is low, θi = SR,
in the selfish region. In this section we introduce a non-
cooperative and one-shot game from the two-vehicle to the
multi-player game, and design the game theoretic algorithm
for the autonomous vehicles.
Fig. 3. The narrow alley networks where two groups of autonomous vehicles
are heading toward opposite directions. The eastbound vehicle 1 has the passed
distance, x1, from starting point, 0. The westbound vehicle 2 has the passed
distance, x2, from starting point, L.
A. Two-Vehicle Game
We assume that there are two vehicles, I = {1, 2}, which
are shown in Figure 3. The eastbound vehicle 1 has the passed
distance, x1, from starting point, 0 and the westbound vehicle
2 has the passed distance, x2, from starting point, L.
The vehicle 1’s best respons to pure strategy profile in each
time slot is given by
a∗1 = argmax
a1∈A
E [u1 (θ1, f1 (a1))] , (3)
where a∗1 denotes the best action of the vehicle 1. If there
are no pure strategy in this game, then each player chooses a
set of mixed strategies. The set of vehicle i’s mixed strategy
is defined by the set of probability distributions over possible
actions, p(A1) = {p (a1 = +1) , p (a1 = 0) , p (a1 = −1)}.
In the two-vehicle game, the expected elapsed time of
vehicle 1, f1, depends on its decision. If the vehicle 1 chooses
the forwarding action, its expected elapsed time, f1 depends
only on the rest of the way, L−x1. If the vehicle 1 selects the
backwarding action, then f1 is similarly calculated by the rest
time of competitor, 2L − x2. The expected elapsed time for
the waiting action is composed of the turning and the thinking
time, 0.5 (L− x1) + 0.5 (2L− x2) + 1, because the vehicle 1
does nothing during the time slot.
In Figure 3, if the vehicle 1 and 2 have the forwarding
action, then the collision occurred between them. The time
cost between the two vehicles tcol is defined as tcol = k , k ∈
[0,∞) where k is time cost rate that is added to their elased
time . In Figure 2, if the vehicle 1 chooses the forwarding
strategy, then its payoff is in the unselfish region. However, if
vehicle 1 chooses the others, the backwarding or the waiting
strategy, then its payoff is in the selfish region.
B. Multi-Vehicle Game
We assume that there are vehicles more than two-vehicle
in the narrow alley. We assume that there are vehicle i + 1
and i− 1, in front and back of the vehicle i, respectively. The
vehicle i in the middle of them has to consider the type of
neighbors. Its best action is defined as follow:
a∗i = argmax
ai∈A
∑
θ −i
∑
a −i
p (θ −i, a −i)ui (θi, fi) , (4)
where -i denotes the vehicles in this road except the vehicle
i. If we could find the utility function of multi-vehicle payoff
matrix, then we can calculate the best-response strategy which
is the solution near to Pareto optimum.
3Fig. 4. The networked robot with the wireless communication module
C. Game Theoretic Algorithm
In the autonomous vehicular networks, there exist a sens-
ing range of each other between the vehicle 1 and 2, i.e.
|s1 − s2| < D (si), where si and D(si) denote the state
of vehicle i and the sensing range of vehicle i on the state
s1 respectively. Two vehicles can detect each other with the
distance measuring sensor, for instance the infrared or the
ultrasonic sensor.
If each vehicle cannot share the information, for example
the types, the elapsed time and so on, then the vehicle
has to predict the possible strategy using only its own. The
vehicles in this road choose its action to maximize its utility
without the clues of neighbors. Assuming that each vehicle,
commonly, chooses a conventional vehicle movement by the
non-cooperative game, we will expect the action of another
vehicle stochastically. According to the outcomes of each
vehicle, it decides its action which is to be minimize the
expected elapsed time and maximize its utility simultaneously.
If they can share information with the others, such as the
type of others, then the uncertainty of the action of others
can be reduced in th this model via wireless communications.
Therefore, we investigate how the communications among the
vehicles can lead the solution near to Pareto optimum where
no one can be made better off by making someone worse off.
In next section, we implemented such a vehicle test-bed to
show the gain of wireless communications, which is based on
the game theoretic algorithm. The algorithm is distributed and
selfish. It is composed of the forwarding part and the game
theoretic strategy part. If the vehicle doesnot sense the other
vehicles, then it has the forwarding action. If the vehicle can
detect the others, then they share the type information and
choice the action which is maximizing their utility function.
Algorithm 1 Game Algorithm With Communications
1: procedure NON-COOPERATIVE GAME(S,Θ)
2: if |si − s−i| ≤ D (si) then . Detecting an object
3: a∗i = argmaxai∈A p (a−i)ui (θi, ai)
4: else
5: ai ← +1 . Forward action
6: end if
7: end procedure
Parameter Value
Frequency band 2.4 GHz
Max signal rate 250 Kb/s
TX range 10 – 100 m
TX power -25 – 0 dBm
Channel bandwidth 2 MHz
Cell size 450 × 450 mm
Motor torque 2.0 Kg/cm
Motor speed 102 rpm
Distance measuring range 10 – 80 cm
Flash Memory 64 MByte
TABLE I
EXPERIMENTAL ENVIRONMENTS
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
A. Robot Structure
We have implemented our non-coperative game theoretic
algorithm on networked robots, which conforms to ZigBee
(IEEE 802.15.4) physical layer specifications. Each robot is
equipped with an 8-bit AVR ATmega128 and a CC2420 chip
as a microcontroller and a radio transceiver, respectively as
in Figure 4. The radio transceiver has the PCB antenna.
We also use the four powerful DC motor and the distance
measuring sensor which has the distance range up to 80cm.
We define the cell size, 450mm, which is less than the the
measuring maximum distance. All of robots have the same
utility function which has the unselfish and selfish region. In
order to synchronize the current time in this network, we use
the assistance node who broadcast the time slot message. We
also define the length of time slot which has 3s for movement
and 1s for communication. As in Figure 1, we implemented
our algorithm on the three-vehicle networks.
B. Communication System
ZigBee (IEEE 802.15.4) module is easy to construct net-
works because of the advantages of ZigBee, for example,
a self-organization, a multi-hop communications and a long
battery lifetime which has a maximum rate 250Kb/s that
is sufficient to share all of information in the networks. In
wireless communications aspect, ZigBee MAC protocol has
CSMA/CA, random backoff and packet transmit type; DATA
or ACK [5]. In our wireless communication test-bed, we use
a broadcasting message which is sent once and then repeated
by the neighborings and check the source address and the
sequence number of the packet. Our experimental environ-
ments are shown in Table I.1 From this implementation, we
investigate how wireless communications among the vehicles
can lead the solution near to Pareto optimum
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present that the gain of wireless commu-
nications in Figure 5. In this simulation, we set the length
of the narrow alley L = 20, and the collision cost rate
k = 10. Each of vehicles can share the information via ad hoc
networking, reduce the average elapsed time per vehicle by
1Moving pictures of the experiments can be downloaded from http :
//hertz.yonsei.ac.kr/Narrow Alley.wmv .
4Fig. 5. The elapsed time per vehicle in the narrow alley
37.8% and 54.0%, respectively, comparing to a conventional
vehicle movement (random) algorithm. By adding the current
state information to the transmitted packets, furthermore, the
average escape time can be reduced by 62.4%.
In Figure 6, we extend to the multiple vehicular networks
in this road. If we use the game-theoretic algorithm without
the wireless communications to our networks, then the Nash
equilibrium is almost up to six times than the social optimum.
On the contrary, if we use the wireless communication among
the vehicles in this road, then we can reduce the congestion
price that closed to Pareto optimum up to four vehicles.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND REMARKS
In this paper, we suggest a non-cooperative game theoretic
model that is to be maximized unselfishly. We investigate
how the wireless communications among the vehicles, can
lead the solution to the nearly Pareto optimum. we presented
simulation that show the gain of wireless communications.
Our game theoretic algorithm can reduce the average escape
time per vehicle by 37.8%. And the information sharing via
ad hoc networks can reduce the average escape time per
vehicle by 54.0%. By adding the current state information to
the transmitted packets, furthermore, the average escape time
can be reduced by 62.4%. In the multiple vehicular networks,
we can reduce the congestion price that closed to Pareto
optimum up to 4 vehicles using the wireless communication
among the vehicles. Based on game theoretic approach
we implemented such the vehicular test-bed, composed of
networked robots.
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